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MARCH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY

NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-AssUMING RISK TO SAVE EMPLOYER'S
PROPERTY. Hill v. East Saint Louis Cotton Oil Co.1 In this case the
Court of Appeals has again laid down the rule, several times expressed
in Missouri, that if one puts himself into a position of danger in order to
save property, which has been endangered by the negligence of defendant,
and is injured in such attempt he is guilty of contributory negligence,
and cannot recover.
Plaintiff was a workman employed in a cotton gin of defendant.
The defendant negligently caused wet cotton to be run thru the machinery, and this fact, combined with defendant's negligent use of a worn
and defective brush wheel (a part of the gin machinery), caused the wet
cotton to catch fire from friction and to endanger the entire property.
The plaintiff, in order to save his master's property, thrust his gloved
hand into a narrow space in close proximity to certain knives to draw
out the burning cotton before it set fire to the property. In so doing
plaintiff's hand was caught in the knives and he was injured. Witnesses
testified that the act of plaintiff in placing his hand where he did was
1.

(1919)

214 S.

W.

419.

(3M2
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dangerous and likely to cause him an injury. Plaintiff had judgment in
the trial court. The Springfield Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, Bradley, J., dissenting. On rehearing the case was remanded.
The decision seems to be well supported by the Missouri cases. A
line of decisions beginning with a dictum in the famous Eckert case in
New York has laid down the proposition that one may not put himself
into peril in order to save property merely. If he does so he precludes
his recovery for an injury so received notwithstanding the fact that the
property was so endangered by the original negligence of the defendant. 2
The rule is applied not only as against a volunteer,8 but also against the
owner of the property endangered, 4 or his servant.5
The case well illustrates the fact that a question which was originally, and as a matter of common sense is, one of fact, to be settled in each
instance by a jury, tends to become a question of law for the court. 6 On
first impression the questiori whether any given set of facts constitutes
negligence ought to be decided by the jury. It will be readily granted
that no act can be deemed negligent apart from the surrounding circumstances. Whether or not a man acts negligently in certain premises depends on the question, "What would the ordinary, reasonable individual
2. Eckert v. Long Island Railroad
Company (1871) 43 N. Y. 502. The
rule which has been followed by the
Missouri courts was here stated in the
following form: "A person voluntarily
placing himself, for the protection of
property, merely, in a position of danger, is negligent, so as to preclude his
recovery for any injury so received."
This statement was obiter dictum since
the court allowed recovery on the theory that the plaintiff was endeavoring to
save human life. This dictum has been
followed in Donohoe v. Railroad (1884)
83 Mo. 560; McManamee v. Railroad
(1896) 135 Mo. 440, 37 S. W. 119; Slinkard v. Lamb Construction Company
(1919) 212 S. W. 61; and the principal case. In the McManamee case the
court approved the following instruction: "Even tho the jury believe that
the deceased's horse and wagon was exposed to a collision with defendant's
train, this would not excuse or justify
him precipitating himself in front of the
train, and if you find that he did so in
order to save his said horse and buggy,
then your verdict must be for the defendant."
Thus the jury was not per-

mitted to pass on the question whether
the plaintiff's act was one which a reasonable man would suppose to be dangerous, or whether it was in fact negligent under the circumstances.
3. Eversole v. Railroad (1913) 249
Mo. 523, 155 S. W. 419.
4. McManamee v. Railroad (1896)
135 Mo. 440, 37 S. W. 119.
5. The principal case. The court ad.
mits that "some weight" may be given
to the fact that the plaintiff was attempting to rescue the property of his mas.
ter, but in refusing to allow the jury to
consider any question other than whether the plaintiff put himself into a dangerous place it is not seen how this
modification of the rule can be of any
benefit to the plaintiff.
6. This tendency is well pointed out
by Prof. Terry in his Principles of An.
glo-American Law, sections 75 and 195.
He says that there can be no such thing
as "negligence per se" or "reasonable.
ness per se." The party is called on
to act or to make a choice and in so
doing he must take into account the
circumstances which make up his situation.
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have done in those same premises?" When the question has been repeatedly put to a jury on any set of circumstances and the jury has uniformly
found that those circumstances do or do not constitute negligence, then
it is conceivable that a rule of law has been established, i. e., that when
similar circumstances arise the court may take judicial notice of such
uniform finding of juries. This process probably accounts for the estab7
lishment of the stop, look, and listen rule which has gained rather wide
acceptance. Likewise it is generally held that the act of pointing a loaded
8
gun at a person is negligent, or even standing on a platform of a moving
train.9 In jurisdictions adopting the above rules the question of negligence is not submitted to the jury at all. If the evidence shows clearly
that the facts exist, then there is no question for the jury. Such circumstances constitute negligence.
A great many courts and writers have pointed out peril in such a
process of reasoning, however. In the first place circumstances are never
-alike. The standard man test applied to questions of negligence always
takes into account as one of the surrounding circumstances the peculiar
knowledge or lack of knowledge of the particular man in question. The
form of the question is not simply, "What would the ordinary, prudent
man have done?" but, "What would the ordinary, prudent man have
done situated as this man was and having the knowledge that he had?"
Now it is conceivable, for instance, that a particular man may never have
heard of a railroad or a fire-arm. In such a case he might reasonably
'be supposed to cross a railroad track without stopping, looking or listening or he might handle a gun in such a manner as to- endanger bystanders. To make these acts negligence is to require all persons to act
at their peril irrespective of whether they are in fact negligent. This
is a possible solution, and may even be good public policy, but if that is
to be the basis of the rule it should be so stated and it should not be
confounded with any question of negligence. It is difficult at best to
make the ordinary jury understand what they are to decide when negligence is in issue. 'When to this question we add a requirement that the
jury shall distinguish simple negligence, gross negligence and recklessness,
as is done in many jurisdictions, it is highly probable that we have made
the task utterly impossible. Nor do we avoid the difficulty by taking the
-question from the jury, that is, by telling them that if they find certain
facts then they must find negligence, when, as a matter of fact, such a
finding conflicts with common sense. There is no surer way of bringing
the law and the courts into disrepute.
7.
ly in
road,
8.

This rule was approved incidentalthe case of McManamee v. Railsupra.
Cases collected in Terry, Princi-

ples of Anglo-American Law, section
200.
9. (1864) 8 Allen (Mass.) 234.
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Even at this late date it is submitted that the doctrine laid down
in the principal case is contrary to the weight of authority in America, 10
and that it runs directly counter to reason and justice and complicates
an already difficult and confused question. With.all respect for the learning of the many courts in accord with the principal case the doctrine
there laid down rests on a fundamental misconception of the nature of
negligence. It is not true that "voluntarily placing one's self in a position
of danger" is negligence. The cases all admit this by recognizing that
one may assume great peril and still not be "deemed negligent" wherethe purpose is to save life." Obviously, a reasonably prudent man will
assume greater risk in order to save human life than to save property.
In other words a given act is not negligent where life is in danger, and
yet the identical act might be grossly negligent if property only be at
stake. The ordinary jury can understand that. But what can a jury beexpected to derive from such an instruction as the following: "A man
may be negligent in order to save life, so long as he is not reckless, and
still not defeat his right to recover for defendant's negligence. But he
may not placa himself in any position of risk or danger in order to save
property. If he does run any risk for such a purpose he is deemed to be
contributorily negligent and his recovery is precluded?" The cautious,
man will run no risk when it is unnecessary to do so. Certain risks must
constantly be taken, however, in the ordinary conduct of life. A servant
who would refuse to run any, evcen the slightest, risk in orier to save
his master's property from inevitable loss would certainly not be doing
his duty. If the risk were very slight and the danger to the property very
great it seems he might even be discharged for neglect of duty. If this
is true is it not a monstrous proposition to refuse him any remedy in an
action for injury, caused by his master's negligence, for the reason that
he placed himself in some danger, when it was his clear duty to assume
such danger?
The Court of Appeals justifies the rule which it lays down by saying: "The most potent fact in favor of this rule is that the servant
has no right to endanger the master in a far greater risk than that which
he sought to avert." 12 True, he has no right to do so negligently, but
must he refrain at his peril from so doing and ought he not to be allowed to go to the jury on the question of whether under the circumstances he was negligent in so endangering his master?
Further, after holding the law to be as stated in the decision in the
principal case, it is not seen what possible good will come to the litigants
10. Shearman and Redfield, Negli.
gence, Section 85d; 20 Ruling Case
Law, section 110, page 133. The cases
are there collected and the statement

made that the great weight of authority
is against the dictum in the Eckert Case.
11. Note 10.
12. The Principal case, page 422.
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from further proceedings. In remanding the case the court limits the
finding of the jury to the question of whether there was "inherent and
Suppose the jury finds
necessary danger attending plaintiff's action."
that the plaintiff took a risk, even the slightest risk, in a dangerous emergency, the plaintiff will be thereby precluded from recovery, even tho
the jury might have found, had the question been submitted, that he did
nothing that a prudent and cautious employe would not have done under
similar circumstances.13
JESSE E. MARSHALL.14
But it is submitted that the decision in the principal case can be
justified on the theory that the conduct of the plaintiff was so clearly
negligent that reasonable minds could not differ about it and that, therefore, there was no question for the jury.
K. C. S.
1-

or DEFENDANT. Ryan et al v. Ortgier.
It was held in the principal case that a cause of action for death from
injury caused by the defendant's negligence did not, under Rev. St. 1909.
sections 105, 106, 5426, and 5438, survive the death of the defendant.
At common law a cause of action for a purely personal tort was ex2
Applying the
tinguished upon the death of either party to the action.
3
maxim actio personalis moritur cur persona,' causes of action for
SURVIVOR OF CAUSE-DEATH

13. The Missouri court has already
held that where a servant is required to
act in an emergency he need not exercise "the perfection of judgment" and
his recovery for an injury to himself is
not precluded by the fact that he might
have acted in such a way as to have
avoided the injury. In the case of
Dean v. Railroad (1911) 156 Mo. App.
634, 137 S. W. 603, the plaintiff, in endeavoring to stop a freight car which
had broken loose and was running down
hill ran under a gang plank which fell
on him and injured him. The evidence
showed that he might safely have stopped the car by going around to the other
side with no risk to himself. The court
allowed plaintiff to recover, saying that
it was his duty to act to save his employer's property, and that in so doing
he was "not required to exercise the
perfection of judgment."
of
Law,
Professor
14. Assistant
School of Law, fall term, 1919.

1. (1919) 208 S. W. 856.
2. Hambly v. Trott (1776) 1 Cowp.
371; Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp.
493; Higgins v. Breen (1845) 9 Mo.
497, 498; Kingsbury v. Lane (1853) 21
Mo. 115; Stanley v. Vogel (1880) 9 Mo.
App. 98, 99; Baker v. Crandall (1883)
78 Mo. 584, 587; Stoeckman v. Terre
Haute, etc.Ry. Co. (1884) 15 Mo. App.
503, 507; Davis v. Morgan (1888) 97
Mo. 79, 80; Bates v. Sylvester (1907)
205 Mo. 493, 496, 104 S. W. 73, 11 L. R.
Gantt v. Brown
A. (N. S.) 1157;
(1912) 244 Mo. 271, 302, 149 S. W.
644.
3. It has been suggested that the
word "Personalis" is a misreading for
See Pollock, Torts, 9th ed.
"poenalis."
p. 64, note (g).
4. 1 Woerner, American Law of AdFor the
ministration, 2 ed. sec. 290.
origin and history of this rule see Goudy, Two Ancient Brocards, in Oxford
Legal Essays, p. 216.

38
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death did not survive the death of the person injured or that of the tortfeasor.5 The reason for this rule may be found in the vindictive and
quasi-criminal 6 character of suits for personal injuries in early law, but
8
once the notion of punishment7 and vengeance is abandoned and that of
compensation substituted as the principal element in the measure of damages in torts, this rule seems wholly inapplicable to modern conditions.
Nor is there any reason why the heirs and legatees of a deceased tortfeasor should not take the estate subject to actions ex delicto as well
as actions er contractu. That this v;ew has obtained to some degree is
9
shown by the inroads made upon the principle both at common law and
10
While the strict rule of the maxim has been modified withby statute.
out the aid of a statute with respect to certain tort actions, it has required
a statute to prevent the abatement of an action for personal injuries
which result in death.
The most important modification of the law in England in this
respect is known as Lord Campbell's Act,'" giving an action to the ex5. McNamara v. Slavens (1882) 76
Mo. 329, 330; Gibbs v. Hannibal, etc.
(1884) 82 Mo. 143; Vawter v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co. (1884) 84 Mo. 683; Hegerick v.
Keddie (1885) 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E.
787; Davis v. Nichols (1891) 54 Ark.
358, 15 S. W. 880; Bates v. Sylvester
(1907) 205 Mo. 493, 104 S. W. 73, 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157.
"All pri6. Lord Mansfield said:
vate criminal injuries or wrongs as well
as all public crimes, are buried with the
offender."
Hambly v. Trott (1776) 1
Cowp. 371, 373- The court said in Mitchell v. Hotchkiss (1880) 48 Conn. 16;
"But all private as well as public wrongs
and crimes are buried with the offender.
The executor does not represent or
stand in the place of the testator as to
those, or as to any acts of misfeasance
or malfeasance as to the person or property of another ...........
7. In Weiss v. Hunsicker, 3 Penn.
Dist. R. 445, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 398,
it was said: ."The right of action is regarded in the nature of a punishment of
the wrong-doer, and, the moment death
supervenes, the action, altho commenced before, abates."
8. "A process which is still felt to be
a substitute for private war may seem
incapable of be:.ng continued on behalf
of or against a dead man's estate, an

impersonal abstraction

.

..

. ....

Pollock, Torts, 9th ed. p. 64. For a
criticism of the common law theory see
17 C. J. note 4, p. 1183.
9. It was early established that an
executor could be made to answer for
some actions not founded on contract
where the estate in his hands was benefited by the tort. See historical note on
the classification of the Forms of Personal Actions, F. W. Maitland, in Pollock, Torts, 9th ed. Appendix A. p. 577,
582. See also, Hambly v. Trott (1776) 1
Cowp. 375; Higgins v. Breen (1845) 9
Mo. 497, 498. The action was permitted
on the doctrine of quasi contracts and
the tort action was transmitted into a
contract action which would survive as
against the executor.
Originally there was no survival of
action for the breach of a simple contract, the notion being that such breach
was a tort. It was not until 1611 that
it was definitely held that assumpsit
would lie against an executor.
See
Pinchon's Case (1511) 9 Co. Rep. 86b;
Wheatley v. Lane (1668) 1 Win. Saunders 216 a.
10. Rev. St. 1909 secs. 105, 106, 5426,
5438.
11. 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, amended by
27 and 28 Vict. c. 95.
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ecutor and administrator for the death of one killed thru the wrongful
act, negligence, or default of another, provided such person could have
maintained an action had he lived. Similar statutes have been adopted
12
in most of the states in this country, and the subject is covered in Missouri by section 5426.13 It is held that this provision does not extend to
the representative of the wrong doer. 14 Also section 105,15 providing for
the survivor, by and against personal representatives, of actions for
wrongs done to "property, rights or interests" does not apply to a
cause of action for personal injury. x6 Section 5438,17 which gives a
right of action for personal injuries "not resulting in death" against the
personal representative of a tort-feasor, did not change the common law
as to actions for personal injuries resulting in death.' 8 Under the con12. See table of statutes, Tiffany,
Death by Wrongful Act. 2 ed. p. XX.
13. Rev. St. 1909.
"Whenever the
death of a person shall be caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then, and in every such
case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued shall be liable to
an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured."
(Sec.
5426.)
14. Hegerick v. Keddie (1885) 99 N.
Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787; Hamilton v. Jones
(1890) 125 Ind. 176, 25 N. E. 192; Davis v. Nichols (1891) 54 Ark. 358, 15 S.
W. 880; Bates v. Sylvester (1907) 205
Mo. 493, 104 S. W. 73, 11 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1157; Gilkerson v. Mo. PaC. Ry. Co.
(1909) 222 Mo. 173, 121 S. W. 138, 24
L. R. A. (N. S.) 844.
15. Rev. St. 1909.
"For all wrongs
done to property, rights, or interests of
another, for which an action might be
maintained against the wrong doer such
action may be brought by the person injured, or, after his death, by his executor or administrator, against such wrong
doer, and, after his death, against his
executor or administrator, in the same
manner and with like effect, in all respects, as an action founded on contract."
(Sec. 105.)
16. Stanley v. Vogel (1880)
9 Mo.

App. 98; Gibbs v. Hannibal etc. (1884)
82 Mo. 143; Hegerich v, Keddic (1885)
99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787; Bates v. Sylvester (1907) 205 Mo. 493, 104 S. W. 73,
11 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1157; Gilkerson v. Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. (1909) 222 Mo. 173, 121 S.
W. 138, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 844; Showen v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1912) 164
Mo. App. 41, 46, 148 S. W. 135; Greer
v. St. Louis I. M. and So. Ry. Co. (1913)
173 Mo. App. 276, 284, 158 S. W. 740.
17. Rev. St. 1909. "Causes of action upon which suit has been or may
hereafter be brought by the injured party for personal injuries, other than those
resulting in death whether such injuries be to the health or to the person o'
the injured party, shall not abate by
reason of his death, nor by reason of
the death of the person against whom
such cause of action shall have accrued;
but in case of the death of either or
both such parties, sucn cause of action
shall survive to the pertonal representative of such injured party, and against
the person, receiver or corporation liable for such injuries and his legal representative, and the liability and the
measure of damages shall be the same as
if such death or deaths had not occurred."
(Sec. 5438.)
18. Bates v, Sylvester (1907) 205 Mo.
493, 104 S. W. 73, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1157; Gilkerson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
(1909) 222 Mo. 173, 121 S. W. 138, 24
L. R. A. (N. S.) 844; Showen v. Met.
St. Ry. Co., (1912) 164 Mo. App. 41, 47,
148 S. W. 135; Greer v. St. Louis I. M.
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structions which have been placed upon sections 105, 106, 5426, and 5438,
of our statutes, the principal case is in accord with the clear weight of
authority in Missouri and other states.
The result is that the common law rule that actions for personal
injuries resulting in death abate with the death of the wrong doer still
obtains in Missouri. Following this rule, if the party injured dies from
a cause other than the injury caused by the willful act or negligence of
the tort-feasor, and the suit has been instituted because of the tort before
the death by independent cause, the action survives to his representative
under section 5438 as against the estate of the deceased wrong doer;
but if death results from the injury caused by such wrong doer, the
action abates upon the wrong doer's death. Since compensation to the
widow, children, parents, next of kin, etc., rather than punishment of the
wrong doer is the fundamental reason for permitting an action for
death, it is submitted that the action for injury resulting in death should
survive against the estate of the tort feasor. However, the remedy for
what has been termed a "barbarous rule" 19 does not lie with the courts,
but is necessarily left with the legislature.
J. C. B.
This note leaves open the question as to whether a cause of action will survive

under section 5438 in the event that the person injured dies from an independent

cause before it has been possible for him to institute a suit.

INSURANCE-MURDER 01 INSURED By THE BENEICIARY.

K. C. S.
Markland v.

Modern Wocdmen of America.l-The beneficiary of a life insurance contract who murders the insured thereby forfeits his interest in the insurance. 2 It would be against public policy to permit him to profit by
his own crime. The interest of the beneficiary is essentially equitable in
nature, and his unclean hands would bar him from recovery;a while the
rights of an heir are strictly legal, and equitable principles would not intervene to prevent him from taking from an ancestor whom he had
4
murdered.
The insurer by the prevailing authority is required to pay the amount
173 Mo. App. 276,

killing was intentional as well as feloni-

1. c. 284, 158 S. W. 740.
19. Pollock, Torts, 2nd ed. p. 64.
1. (1919) 2'0 S. W. 921.
2. Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. (1910) 82 Oh. St. 208, 92 N. E. 26;
Murchison v. Murchison (1918) 203 S.
W. (Tex.) 423. A beneficiary who had
caused death of insured through negli.
ligence and had been convicted of man.
slaughter was permitted to recover insurance in absence of a showing that the

ous in Schreiner v. High Court I. C. 0.
F. (1889) 35 I1. App. S76.
3. See note: Murder of the Insured
by the Beneficiary, 24 H. L. R. 227.
4. Shellenberger v. Ransom (1891) 31
Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700, 25 L. R. A. 564
and note. Contra: Riggs v. Palmer
(1889) 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5
L. R. A. 340 and note; Perry v. Straw.
bridge (1908) 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W.
621.

& So. Ry. Co. (1913)
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5
forfeited by the beneficiary to the estate of the insured. The theory of
recoveryr is not settled. The beneficiary alone is entitled to sue on the
7
6
The theory adopted in Cleaver v. Association, an English
contract.
case, was that upon the forfeiture by the beneficiary a trust resulted to
the estate of the insured. An early Iowa case, Schmidt v. Northern Life
Association,8 was decided on the same reasoning. This view has been
criticised in that no specific fund is set aside as a trust res. Another
theory suggested that the obligation of the insurer is quasi contractual
for unjust enrichment. 9 The case is analagous to that where the designated beneficiary is of an ineligible class or later becomes ineligible. 10
Confusion arises when the murdered is both beneficiary of the insurance and heir of the insured. In Murchison v. Murchison- the anomalous result is reached that the murderer could take the insurance as
sole heir of the insured but could not recover as beneficiary. The court
in McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 refused recovery to the estate of
the insured because the offending beneficiaries were also the heirs, but
intimated that there might be a recovery of sufficient assets to satisf3
creditors of the insured. The difficulty was obviated in Sharpless v.
Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.13 by permitting the next of kin of the insured
after the beneficiary to take the insurance as if the beneficiary had predeceased the insured.
The heirs of the insured are not barred from taking because they
happen to be the heirs of the offending beneficiary. 14 This situation
frequently presents itself where children take from an insured parent
who has been slain by the beneficiary parent. There is dictum in Greer v.
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur 5 to the effect that to permit the children to
take in such a case would be a temptation to the father to kill his wife
to secure to their children the benefit of her insurance. This argument

5. Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Association (1892) 1 Q. B. 147;
Schmidt v. Northern Life Association
(1900) 112 Ia. 41, 83 N. W. 800, 51 L.
R. A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323; Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (1910) 152
N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53; Knights of Honor
v. Menkhausen (1904) 209 I1. 277, 70
N. E. 567, 65 L. R. A. 508, 101 Am.
St. Rep. 239; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Weightman (1916) 160 Pac.
(Okla.) 629; Sharpless v. Grand Lodge
A. 0. U. W. (1916) 159 N. W. (Minn.)
1068; Murchison v. Murchison, supra.
Contra: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Arm.
strong (1886) 117 U. S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 877.
6. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Arm.

strong, supra.

7. (1892) 1 0. B. 147.
8. (1900) 112 Ia. 41, 83 N. W. 800.
9. Murder of the Insured by the
Beneficiary, 14 H. L. R. 375.
10. Order of Railway Conductors v.
Koster (1893) 55 Mo. App. 186; Shea
v. Benefit Association (1893) 160 Mass.
289; Knights of Honor v. Men khausen
(1904) 209 Ill. 277, 283; 14 H. L. R.
376.
11. (1918) 203 S. W. (Tex.) 423.
12. (1916) 160 N. W. (Iowa) 289.
13. (1916) 159 N. W. (Minn.) 1068.
14. Knights of Honor v. Menkhausen, supra.
15. (1917) 195 Mo. App. 336, _190 S.
W. 72, 74.
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is soundly criticised in Knights of Honor v. Menkhausen,16 and it is not
believed that a Missouri court would give serious consideration to such
reasoning.
In Markland v. Modern Woodmen of America the wife who was the
beneficiary of her husband's insurance died by her own hand a few
hours before her husband whom she had murdered.. Their children
claimed the insurance as heirs of the insured under a provision in the
certificate which designated the heirs of the insured as beneficiaries in
event the beneficiary named therein did not survive the insured. The
plaintiffs contended that the provision in the contract that the certificate
and all payments made thereon should be forfeited to the defendants
if the beneficiary should cause the death of the insured did not apply
since the wife dying before her husband never became the beneficiary,
but the court held that the person named as beneficiary therein was contemplated and death by her hand was an excepted risk. Greer v. Supreme
Tribe of Ben Hur, supra, which was decided upon a similar contract provision, was cited with approval.
The result in these two cases and in the similar case, Griffith v. Mutual Protective League,'7 was properly reached upon the peculiar provisions of the contract of insurance, but the dictum, which appears in the
Greer case to the effect that recovery should not be had even in the absence of such stipulations, is unfortunate. Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of
Va.,' s a case exactly in point with the principal case except for the unfavorable contract provisions, correctly held, it seems, that the heirs of
the insured were entitled to the insurance. While in the principal case
the action was brought on the contract of insurance by the heirs of the
insured as beneficiaries, in the Anderson case the action was apparently
brought on a quasi-contractual obligation against the administrator of the
beneficiary and insurer.
It would seem that, in the absence of stipulations in the policy or
benefit certificate to the contrary, when the beneficiary forfeits his interest by murdering the insured, the estate of the insured should be allowed
to recover upon a quasi-contractual obligation for unjust enrichment.
The disposition thereof would be controlled by the laws of inheritance.
It is for the legislature to determine the rights of an heir to the property
of an ancestor whom he has murdered.
R. E. H.
16.

(1904)

299 Il.

The court there said:

277, loc.cit. 280.

"Human experi-

comes well nigh inconsequential."

17.

(1918)

200 Mo. App. 87, 205 S.

ence teaches that those willing to commit
murder and assume the risk of punish-

W. 286. See also, Grand Circle Women
of Woodcraft v. Rausch (1913) 24 Col.

ment for the benefit of others are so few
in number that consideration thereof be-

App. 304, 134 Pac. 141.
18. (1910) 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53.
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WITNESS-IMPEACHMENT-SUPPORT

BY CHARACTER

WITNESSES.

Or-

ris v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. R. Co.'-As a witness in his
own behalf the plaintiff was impeached by proof of prior inconsistent
statements in a deposition and in a signed statement to the company
doctor. He was further subjected to a rigid and searching cross examination tending to reflect on his veracity. The Supreme Court held that
it was not error to reject testimony as to his reputation for truth and
veracity offered to rehabilitate him. The rule of the Missouri Courts of
Appeals 2 admitting such testimony was expressly overruled, the court
saying that the alleged impeaching matter in-these instances went to the
credit to be given his testimony rather than to his character and that
the value of the testimony as to character would not outweigh the confusion of issues.
Miller v. St. Louis R. R. Co." seems the first of the overruled Courts
of Appeals' decisions to say that after proof of prior inconsistent statements or after a cross examination tending to impugn veracity evidence
of character for truth and veracity could be introduced to support the
witness. This decision followed the Vermont Case, Paine v. Tilden, 4
based in turn, upon the rule of Phillips and of Greenleaf who rely on the
Nisi Prius case of Rex v. Clarke.5 There the complainant in a rape case,
on cross examination, admitted that she had been twice sentenced to the
house of correction for theft. But she was allowed to state that she had
later been an inmate of the home for the destitute and upon discharge
had received an award for good conduct. Holroyd, J., held it proper
to permit the superintendent of the latter institution to testify to her good
character while there. Courts6 denying the rule admitting the testimony
have criticised Phillips and Greenleaf as not being supported by Rex v.
Clarke. This criticism seems well taken. The prosecutrix was impeached
by her own admissions and the only effect the evidence of the superintendent could have had was to show a subsequent reform. This is en7
tirely different from the present question.
Six prior decisions of the Supreme Court are cited in support of the
rule excluding the evidence. Five of these s hold that evidence of the
1. (1919) 214 S. W. 124.
2. Miller v. R. R. Co. (1878) 5 Mo.
App. I. c. 481;
Walker v. Ins. Co.
(1895) 62 Mo. App. 1. c. 220; Berryman v. Cox (1897) 73 Mo. App. 1. c. 74;
Browning v. R. R. (1906) 118 Mo. App.
1. c. 451, 94 S. W. 315; Brandom v. R.
R. (1908) 134 Mo. App. 1. c. 89, 114 S.
W. 543; Gourley v. Callahan (1915) 190
Mo. App. I. c. 666, 176 S. W. 239; Ross
v. Pants Co. (1913) 170 Mo. App. 291,
156 S. W. 92.

3.
(1878) 5 Mo. App. I. c. 481.
4. (1848) 20 Vt. 554.
5.
(1817) 2 Starkie's Cases 241,
6. Stamper v. Griffin (1853) 12 Ga.
450; Brown v. Mooers (1856) 6 Gray
(Mass.) 1. c. 453.
7. 2 Wigmore's Evid. sec. 1117.
8. Gutawiller v. Lackman (1856) 23
Mo. 1. c. 172;
Rogers & Gillis v.
Troost's Admin. (1873) 51 Mo. 1. c. 476;
Dudley v. MeClurer (1877) 65 Mo. 241;
Vawter v. Hultz (1892) 112 Mo. 633, 20
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character of a party as a party in a civil suit may not be introduced unless involved in the issue and is not relevant to the question of testimony to support the character of a party in the role of witness. This dis9
tinction is pointed out in Alkire Groc. Co. v. Tagart. The remaining
case of Bank v. Richmond' o denied the right to introduce rehabilitating
evidence as to the character of a witness whose statement had been contradicted by other witnesses and does not involve the instant question.
A statement out of court contradictory to his testimony under oath,
may impeach the veracity of the witness or it may only establish a bias,
interest or defect of memory. In either case an inference arises that his
testimony is unreliable. If the discrepancy is due to a defective memory, bias or interest it is beside the issue to introduce testimony as to his
reputation for truth speaking. Since such testimony only tends to rehabilitate the witness in one of several possible defects the question is
whether the end attained would justify the necessary multiplication of
issues. The rule forbidding the introduction of such testimony is supported by reason and is approved by one of the best writers on the subject."
It is clear that the supporting testimony should not be admitted
merely to enable the jury to decide whether the witness had in fact
made a prior inconsistent statement (he denying it) since mere contra12
diction among witnesses will not allow such support.
The witness should of course be allowed opportunity to explain the
18
If only part of a statement or conversainconsistency if he is able.
tion has been introduced he is entitled to have the whole presented to
14
Furthermore, the
establish that in its entirety it was not inconsistent.
5
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Sharp' allowed support thru the
medium of prior consistent statements.
A somewhat different question is presented where the witness has
been impeached by the character or type of cross examination used. This
is not the case of a witness who on his cross examination admits prior
misconduct. In that instance there is no logical ground for character
witnesses to sustain him. A score of witnesses in support of his character
could not erase the misdeed which stands admitted. Nor is it the case of
a predicate laid in cross examination for his impeachement. The Supreme
Court has denied the right to support in the case where the only im6
peaching matter has been laying of a predicate.'
S. W.

689; Black V. Epstein (1909)

221

Mo. 1. c. 305, 120 S. W. 754.
9. (1898) 78 Mo. App. 1. c. 168.
10. (1911) 235 Mo. 1. c. 542, 139 S.
W. 352.
11.

2 Wigmore's Evid. Sec. 1108.

12. Bank v.
Mo. 1. c. 542,

Richmond

(1911)

13.

W.

235

2 Wigmore's Evid. sec. 1044-6.

14. Wilkerson v. Eilers (1892) 114
Mo. 245, 21 S. W. 514. State v. Phil.
lips and Ross (1857) 24 Mo. 1. c. 485.
15. (1904) 183 Mo. 1. c. 735, 82 S.
134.

16. State v. Cooper (1880)
c. 442.

71 Mo. 1.
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That this type of impeachment goes to character and not credit is
recognized by the court in the instant case where it speaks of a "cross
examination tending to reflect on the veracity of the plaintiff."
T
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Richmond v. Richmond,' after
a cross examination which it said was clearly meant to be a demonstration to the jury against the veracity of the witness, allowed testimony as
20
19
18
to his reputation for truth. Louisiana, Vermont, and Virginia follow
21
and Conthis doctrine. A similar result has been reached in Texas,
22
necticut where the witness is a stranger at the place of trial.
The question again is: Should the harm done a party thru the imputation placed on his witness outweigh the harm of an increase of issues
attendant on the admission of supporting evidence?
Such a cross examination is a direct attack upon character. In the
hands of skillful counsel it is a dangerous weapon and may leave a lasting impression in the mind of the jury. The introduction of supporting
evidence in the case of prior inconsistent statements did not solve the
difficulty because it might have been the inconsistency of a veracious
witness due to a defective memory. In this case the introduction of evidence as to character meets squarely the imputation placed on character.
Much of the effect of impeachment by this type of cross examination
depends on the setting, on gesture, on emphasis, which cannot be incorporated into the record for review by an appellate tribunal. Where support is allowed to the impeached witness it would seem logical to make
it discretionary with the trial judge.
J. A. W.
ALLOWING PUNITVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-INsTRUCTIONS
State ex rel v. Ellison.'-Georgia B. Griggs brought an
action under Section 5425 R. S. 1909,2 for the death of her husband
whom she alleged was killed by the negligence of the receivers of the
Metropolitan Street Railway Co. in operating their street car.
TO THE JURY.

The court instructed the jury that
damages they were to consider (a) the
(b) the facts constituting negligence.
was proper for the jury to consider
rounding the death of Charles Griggs
17. (1837) 10 Yerg (Tenn.) 343.
18. State v. Johnson (1895) 47 La.
Ann. 1225, 17 So. 789.
19. Paine v. Tilden (1848) 20 Vt.
554.
28
20. George v. Pilcher (1877)
Gratt. (Va.) 1.c. 316, 26 Amer. Rep. 350.

in ascertaining the amount of the
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and
The receivers admitted that it
the facts and circumstances surin order to determine the ques-

21. Harris v. The Stife (1906) 49
Tex. Cr. 1. c. 339, 94 S. W. 227.
22. Rogers v. Moore (1833) 10 Conn.
1. c. 15.
1. (1919) 213 S. W. 459.
2. "Whenever any person ....
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tion of liability but contended that it was not proper to consider the nature of the negligent acts to enhance the damages. The supreme court,
"en banc, upheld this contention.
The basic principle of the law of damages is compensation to the
plaintiff for an injury which he has suffered from the defendant's wrongful act.3 In addition to allowing the plaintiff compensatory or remedial
damages, the common law also recognizes another class of damages
known variously as punitive or exemplary damages or smart money.
Punitive damages are not allowed in all tort actions, but only in those
done in a wanton, willful or malicious manner.4 This rule is an anomaly,
but it has found a firm and abiding place in our system of jurisprudence. 5
The supposed justification for the rule is to punish the defendant for his
wrongful act in order that he may be restrained from repeating the offense and to make an example of him in order that others may be de6
Such reasoning seems to lose
terred from perpetrating similar offenses.
sight of the essential justification of all damages, i. e. that he who has
been injured shall be recompensed. If the defendant has committed a
crime he should be brought before the proper criminal tribunal. The
plaintiff has no rightful claim to such damages for, in theory at least,
he has been fully recompensed when actual damages are allowed.
The relief granted is not commensurate with the damages suffered
if the plaintiff may obtain punitive damages. Indeed, leaving out cases
where special damages are recoverable it is hard to understand how the
plaintiff sustains a greater loss if her husband has been maliciously
killed than she would had he been killed only because of the defendant's
negligence.
The wrongful death statute7 in Missouri which preceded the statute
involved in the principal case had been construed to provide for punitive damages. The courts have held that this statute had both compensatory and penal features, but that the penal features overshadowed
shall die from injury resulting or occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulness,
or criminal intent of any .
......
agent, servant, or employee, whilst running, conducting or managing ....
any street, electric, or terminal car or
train of cars .....
.. the corporation .
.....
.. in whose employ any
such .
.....
agent, servant, employee .
.....
.. shall be at the time
such injury is committed .....
shall forfeit and pay as a penalty for
every such peron ......
.the
sum
of not less than two thousand, and not
exceeding ten thousand dollars, in the
discretion of the jury."

3. Greenleaf, Evidence, vol. 2, see.
253 to 266; Sedgwick, Damages, Sec.
584.
4. Ickenroth v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1903) 102 Mo. App. 597, 77 S. W. 162;
Gray v. McDonald (1891) 104 Mo. 1. c.
314, 16 S. W. 398.
5. Sedgwick, Damages, sec. 466.
6. Whipple v. Walpole (1839) 10 N.
H. 130.
7. Sec. 2864 R. S. Mo. 1899 "...
the
corporation
.
. . in whose employ
the employee

.

.

shall be

.

at the time any injury is received
shall forfeit and pay
sand dollars
.
.

.

.

.

. .

.

five thou-
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the other element so that the plaintiff had always to bring suit for the
maximum sum which was $5,000.8 Thus, in a recent Missouri case the
court in discussing this statute said: "The Legislature intended that the
perpetrator of mischief sought to be prevented should pay the full penalty
levied and did not intend that the private citizen should fritter away that
penalty provided by virtue of the police power of the state for the purpose of preventing wrongs." O In interpreting this act the court in Gray
°
v. McDonald said that "aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
well known to the law when used by the Legislature, so that the statutes
. must mean that in these actions . . . the party suing may recover not only actual, but also exemplary, damages." In the light of these
decisions and in view of the fact that it was difficult to tell just what
part of the sum recoverable was penal and what actual damages, the circumstances of the act appear to have been proper facts for consideration
by the jury on the question of damages.
Section 5425 R. S. Mo. 1909 changed the original act and allowed the
injured party to recover not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000
in the discretion of the jury. No express provision is made for considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the offense. The
1
and in
earlier decisions interpreted this act as being wholly penal
support of this theory quite properly refused to allow any evidence to
be introduced to show how much loss the plaintiff had sustained. But
the circumstances of the offense were considered in determining the
13
12
these earlier decisions were
In the Boyd case
quantum of damages.
overruled and the court held that this statute was penal as to $2,000 but
that any sum in excess of this sum was compensatory damages. This
14
decision which has since been approved was also followed in the principal case. To recover $2,000 the plaintiff need only show that the defendant committed the offense. To prove liability was to make a proper
case for the granting of the penal sum but in excess of this sum the
plaintiff must show actual damages.
Since it had been decided that the sum of $2,000 was penal there
was no necessity for considering the circumstances of the defendant's
act to affect this sum. Nor would it seem proper to consider the act in
8. Philpott v. Railroad (1884) 85 Mo.
164; King v. Railroad (1889) 98 Mo.
235, 11 S. W. 563; Casey v. Transit Co.
(1907) 205 Mo. 721, 103 S. W. 1146.
9. Johnson v. C. M. and St. P. Ry.
Co. (1916) 270 Mo. 418, 193 S. W. 827.

12.
rvin v. Railroad (1911) 158 Mo.
App. 1, 139 S. W. 498; Pratt v. Railroad (1909) 139 Mo. App. 502, 122 S.
W. 1125.
13. Boyd v. Railroad (1912) 249 Mo.
110, 155 S. W. 13.

104 Mo. 314, 116 S. W.

14. Johnson v. C. M. & St. P. Ry.
Co. (1916) 270 Mo. 418, 193 S. W. 827.

11. Young v. Railroad (1909) 227 Mo.
307, 127 S. W. 19.

15. Sarazin v. Union Ry. Co. (1899)
153 Mo. 485, 155 S. W. 92.

10.
398.

(1891)
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order to enhance the actual or compensatory damages for the character
of the act would seem to bear no relation to the actual loss suffered.
The court in the principal case intimates, but does not decide, that it
would never be proper under this section to go into the facts of the
wrongful death to enlarge or decrease the actual damages. Since this
intimation is sound in principle it is hoped that it will prevail.
C. E. C.
AUTOMOBILES-DEGREE OF CARE-NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEG-

LIGENcE. Threadgill v. United Railways Company of St. Louis.1-Laws
1911, p. 330, par. 12, subsec. 9, provides that automobiles shall be driven
with "the highest degree of care that a very careful person would use
under like or similar circumstances, to prevent injury or death to persons, on" etc.
In England v. Southwestern R. R. Co.,2 the Springfield Court of Appeals said that tho the plaintiff (the driver of an automobile struck by a
locomotive belonging to the defendant) was contributorily negligent in
that he had not used reasonable care, the above mentioned statute placed
him under the duty of using the highest degree of care. The remark
with reference to the statutory duty was dictum.
In Advance Transfer Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,3 and Hopkins v. Sweeney Automobile School,4 the Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that the driver of an automobile was under duty to use reasonable
care to protect himself and that the statutory duty was the duty owed
other persons, distinguishing England v. Southwestern R. R. Co., supra.
In Hopkins v. Sweeney Automobile School, supra, the court said that the
statute, being in derogation of the common law, was to be strictly construed.
In Stepp v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 5 the Springfield Court of Appeals
followed the doctrine of the Kansas City Court of Appeals as set forth in
the two last mentioned cases, endorsing the distinction the latter court
had made of England v. Southwestern R. R. Co., supra.
In Threadgill v. United Railways Company of St. Louis, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri evidently took the position that the automobile driver must exercise the highest degree of care whether he was
charged with negligence or contributory negligence. Graves, J. said,
1. c. 165: "'he person driving a motor vehicle has a rule of conduct
prescribed for him by this statute. That rule of conduct is the 'highest
degree of care' ". But in State ex rel v. Ellison,6 Graves, J.said: "We
1.
2.
3.

(1919) 214 S. W. 161.
(1915) 180 S. W. 32.
(1917) 195 S. W. 566.

4.
5.
6.

(1917) 196 S. W. 772.
(1919) 211 S. W. 730.
(1919) 213 S. W. 459, 1. c. 461.
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have no degrees of negligence in Missouri, so far as the right to recover
for negligence is concerned," which statement he limited to the "case in
hand" which was under a statute not requiring the "highest degree of
care".
It is submitted that there is but one degree of care applicable to all
cases involving recovery for negligent acts or the defense of contributory
negligence; that statutes and judicial opinions differentiating between
highest degree, slight and ordinary are but prolific breeders of litigation,
as shown by the above cited cases; and that the amount of care legally
required is due care under the circumstances, the variance possible in the
latter being infinite.
Authority for this is almost unlimited. In the Supreme Court of the
United States it was said that "ordinary care in certain circumstances
may be gross negligence under different circumstances." 7 The same
theory was announced in Maine in the case of Raymond v. Portland R.
R. Co., 8 citing two Missouri cases 9 among a large collection of authorities; in Massachusetts (the case involving the duty of a carrier to a
passenger), ° in Pennsylvania,'" Alabama,' 2 California, I3 Illinois 14 and
in the Federal Courts. 15 The. injuries in the above cases were caused by
various instrumentalities from cattle to railroad trains.
On the question of the care required of the drivers of automobiles
the New York court said: "The driver of an automobile is under a duty
to use reasonable care but . .. . it is manifest that what would be reasonable care and safe conduct in the case of a light and slow moving wagon often times would not amount to such conduct in the case of heavy and
rapidly moving cars." 6 The South Carolina court took "judicial notice
that automobiles have a tendency to frighten animals" and said the
"duty arises to use due care to prevent accidents but what is due care in
7. Holladay v. Kennard (1870) 12
Star of
Wall. 254, 20 L. Ed. 390;
Hope (1873) 17 Wall. 651, 21 L. Ed.
719; Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Richardson (1875) 91 U. S. 454, 33 L. Ed.
356; Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Ives
(1891) 144 U. S. 408, 36 L. Ed. 485, 12
S. Ct. Rep. 679.
8. (1905) 100 Me. 529, 62 Ati. 602,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94.
9. McPheeters v. Hannibal etc. Ry.
Co. (1869) 45 Mo. 22; Reed v. Western
U. T. Co. (1896) 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W.
904, 34 ,. R. A. 492, 58 A. S. R. 609.
10. Cayser v. Taylor (1857) 10 Gray
274. But see Dodge v. Boston & B. S.
S. Co. (1889) 148 Mass. 207, 19 N. E.

373, 2 L. R. A. 83, 12 A. S. R. 541.
11. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Ogier (1860)
35 Pa. 60, 78 Am. Dec. 322.
12. Matson v. Maupin & Co. (1885)
75 Ala. 312.
13. Fox v. Oakland C. St. Ry. (1897)
118 Cal. 55, 50 Pac. 25, 62 A. S. R.
216.
14. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v.
Hamler (1905) 215 Il1. 525, 74 N. E.
705, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 106 A. S. R.
187, citing McPheeters v. R. R., supra.
15. Smith v. Day (1898) 86 Fed. 62,
Carter v. Kansas City C. Ry. Co. (1890)
42 Fed. 37.
16. Mark v. Fritsch (1909) 195 N.'Y.
282, 88 N. E. 380.
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one case may not be in another." 17 The Delaware court in Hannigan v.
Wright,
after holding owners of automobiles and owners of other
vehicles on the streets must each use reasonable care, said: "In determining therefore, the degree of care that the operator of an automobile
should have used the jury must take into consideration its speed, size,
appearance, manner of movement, the amount of noise it makes, and
anything else that indicates unusual or peculiar dangers" and "the driver must take into consideration the character of his machine and its
tendency to frighten horses."
In McFern v. Gardner,"' the St. Louis Court of Appeals (before
the passage of Laws 1907, p. 73, incorporated in R. S. Mo. 1909, sec. 8523)
said: "We can see no reason why the chauffeur in charge of an automobile, traveling on a public highway in a populous city should not be held
to the same degree of care in respect to pedestrians and other vehicles
upon the street as is a motorman in charge of a street car running on a
public street." In Hall v. Compton 2o the Kansas City Court of Appeals,
resting the matter squarely on the common law duty, said that the defendant was not liable if he was using due care, but that the possession of a powerful and dangerous vehicle imposed on the defendant the
duty to use care commensurate with the danger to others engendered by
the presence of his vehicle on the streets, citing with approval McFern v.
Gardner and quoting the above excerpt. In Haake v. Davis,!L the same
court, making no reference to a statute, said: "It was the duty of defendant in running his car to exercise care commensurate with the exigencies of the situation - - -. An ordinarily careful and prudent person
in his position would have realized the danger of running thru a large,
noisy, mixed crowd in any but the most cautious manner. In such cases
the greates'. care is only ordinary care."
The St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Bongner v. Ziegenhein22 cited McFern v. Gardner, supra, and Hall v. Compton, supra, as
showing the correct duty as to the amount of care, tho the case came
up under sec. 8523 R. S. Mo. 1909, requiring the highest degree of care
that a very careful person would use under like or similar circumstances,
the indential words of the statute 21 under which the Kansas City Court
of Appeals decided Hopkins v. Sweeney Automobile School.2 4 The latter
17. Roche.,ter v. Bull (1907) 78 S.
Car. 249, 58 S. E. 766.
18. 5 Pennewill's (Del.)
Reports,
537, 63 Att. 234, -cited with approval in
Tudor v. Brown (1910) 152 N. Car. 441,
67 S. E. 1015, the court saying the
"duty is measured by the exigencies of
the situation."
19. (1906) 121 Mo. App. 1, 97 S. W.

972.
20. (1908) 130 Mo. App. 675, 108
S. W. 1122.
21. (1912) 166 Mo. App. 249, 1. c.
255, 148 S. W. 450.
22. (1912)
165 Mo. App. 328, 147
S. W. 182.
23. Laws 1911, p. 330.
24. (1917) 196 S. W. 772.
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25
court in Ginter v. Donohue, an automobile injury case arising under
sec. 8523 R. S. Mo. 1909, said that the "measure of care varies" and is
"to be determined according to the exigencies of the situation," citing
Bongner v. Ziegenhein, supra, and Haake v. Davis, supra. In Meenach v.
26
Crawford the Supreme Court of Missouri cited McFern v. Gardner,
supra, (which held that a defendant must exercise ordinary care) as
showing the duty under laws of 1911, p. 330, par. 12, subsec. 9.
Custom and habit are often of more force than logical principles.
The confusion which has arisen is due to failure to recognize once for
all that it is thoroughly impracticable to decide tort liability on the basis
of different degrees of care. No doubt the courts are to blame for the
legislature embodying within the statute the phrase "highest degree of
care." But it would have been simple to have said that the legislature
only intended to require that standard of care which is scientifically
sound i. e. the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise
under the same circumstances. If the problem had been approached
from that angle the Kansas City Court of Appeals would not have found
Statute under consideration was in
it necessary to have said that 2 the
7
derogation of the common law.

Professor John Chipman Gray in his "The Nature and Sources of
the Law" says: (sec. 367) "A statute is the expressed will of the legislative organ of society, but until the dealers in psychic forces succeed
in making of thought transference a working controllable force (and'
the psychic transference of the thought of an artificial body must stagger the most advanced ghost hunters), the will of the legislature has to.
be expressed by words, spoken or written."
28
says: "A word is not a crystal, transparent
Mr. Justice Holmes
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in whicb
it is used."
Thus, statutes must be interpreted by courts to give them meaning
and they are interpreted thru the mind of the court. If the court think,
as in the present case, that the statute logically covers the duty of a motor,
vehicle driver in all cases tho the statute does not specifically cover allt
cases, that is the law and as reasonable and sensible as an interpretation,
of a burglary statute, that provides for punishment of all persons, to,
exclude children under, say, five years of age. The court is "clear" in
the latter case that the legislature "intended" their exclusion.
25.
(1915) 179
26. (1916) 187
27. Hopkins v.
Scool (1917) 196
sec. 8523 R. S.

S. W. 732.
S. W. 879.
Sweeney Automobile
S. W. 772. See also
Mo. 1909 using the

same words as the present statuteto describe the degree of care required of
automobile drivers.
Towne v. Eisner (1917) 245 U. S.
28.
425.

52

LAW SERIES

18,

MISSOURI BULLETIN

If the legislature use other words, e. g. highest degree of care, which
are shown to mean only the care of a reasonable and prudent man in the
circumstances why need the courts endeavor to find for them an impossible meaning?
The viciousness lies, of course, in their use in instructions, for as soon
as a jury is told that the duty of an automobile driver is to use the
highest degree of care that a very careful person would use, and it is impressed upon them by a zealous advocate that this is "not just ordinary
care" etc., immediately the automobile driver becomes an insurer for the
other person's safety.
BRYAN WILSON29
29. Student,
School of Law.

Senior
Ed.

Law

Class,

